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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the dependency of local public finance 
from various forms of taxation related to urban 
development and real estate has become increasingly 
evident in Italy. Nevertheless, to date no organic 
relationship seems to have been established between 
fiscal policies, on the one hand, and urban planning, 
on the other. 
This article examines the ties linking the two areas, 
focusing on different types of taxes and discussing the 
aspects that have come to influence the area of 
planning, with special regard to territorial competition, 
urban equalization, building rights and land 
consumption mitigation measures. 
KEYWORDS: 
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ABSTRACT 
近些年在意大利，地方公共财政已经变得越来越依 
赖与城市开发和房地产相关的各形税收。但到目前 
为止，财政政策与城市规划之间似乎并没有建立有 
机联系。 
本人将研究连接着两个领域的纽带，聚焦于不同类 
型的税收，讨论会影响规划的各个方面，并特别涉 
及区域竞争、城市均衡、建筑权利和土地消耗缓解 
措施。 
KEYWORDS: 
税收,城市规划,财政联邦主义 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last twenty years, the introduction of new local taxes, ICI and IMU in particular, has made clear the 
link between tax and urban policies. This link is anything but new: tax reform was an alternative to failed 
urban reforms already in the Sixties (Sullo, 1964), not to mention Constitutional Court decisions on pre-
emptive expropriation of buildable land (Sandulli; Spasiano; Stella Richter, 2007).  
In those year, taxes were seen as an instrument for the reuptake of urban income, or for the mitigation of 
big disparities as a consequence of land transformation. The link between the two policies is nowadays far 
more complex and integrated with planning instruments, because taxes on urban transformation are 
increasingly high and because urban planning legislation is getting more and more complex, what surely has 
an impact on the whole planning process. 
On the other hand, the economic framework since 2007 is having an impact both on real estate market and 
on urban planning, with unexpected phenomena still waiting for in-depth studies (Cutini, Rusci 2015). 
In such a context, governing the territory in a broad sense (i.e. with regard to the economic dimension that 
makes governance possible) pose the risk for fiscal and economic policies to subordinate planning choices to 
budget needs. This is what has already happened in the past, in times of expanding market, thanks to the 
possibility to partly use urban fees for local expense financing, thus converting urban expansion into a fuel 
for public policies. Such a phenomenon is true even today, in an abnormally long recession, with the aim to 
raise funds in order to comply with budget obligations deriving from European policies. 
Once again it seems that in Italy territory governance still remains linked to expansive and transformative 
dynamics, instead of conquering its own strategical and political dimension. This leads to operating tools 
more oriented towards projects and space than towards programs and systems. 
In a phase when urban expansion and resources for urban planning and public works cannot be taken for 
granted, these are the reason why territory governance risks being out of game, replaced by more 
specialized disciplines, pertaining to the economic and legal field, which are less able to read and organically 
envisage the complexity of a territory. 
Beside that, urban planning policies are traditionally pro-cyclic ones: the trend is to strengthen obligations 
and charges during stagnation, and to deregulate and de-tax when economy is growing (Curti, 2004). Such 
a trend reduces the capability of urban planning to identify new strategies for emerging problems. As an 
example, let's simply think of the many measures which were adopted to contain land consumption (e. g., 
Tuscany's Regional Law n. 65 of 2014), or to capture land capital gain: the paradox is that such measures 
were substantially missing during the big urban and economic expansion in the Nineties. 
It is therefore interesting to study the influence that all the different elements pertaining to various 
disciplines are having on territory governance, with a clear impact in terms of land planning and policies. In 
this article we analyse from an urban planning viewpoint the consequences of new fiscal instruments on 
planning, paying special attention not only to problems, but also to unexpressed potential in management 
tools: urban equalization above all, transfer of development rights, and land consumption mitigation 
measures. 
2 TAXATION AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE 
Local government taxation is obviously most directly impacting on territorial governance and can be divided 
into two broad categories: levies relating to urban development, i.e. the various forms of building fees 
(urban taxation); levies on real estate, basically IMU and ICI (property taxation). A third form of contribution 
has come into being recently, a non-strictly fiscal one: urban equalization, which - as we shall see - shares 
some traits in common with more traditional levy instruments. 
The adoption of fiscal federalism at council level, together with a progressive – and programmed – 
weakening of transfers from the State, has led to a very strong link between council budgets and real 
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estate: in 2012, IMU alone accounted for 30.69% of total municipal income (source: ISTAT, MEF – Ministry 
of Economy and Finance), thus establishing a direct dependence of local finance on economic cycle and real 
estate market (Ferri, Adobati 2011), as well as on urban growth as we shall see. 
Urban planning taxation – meaning those charges for primary and secondary urban developments as defined 
in Law n. 10 of January 28, 1977 – represents a una tantum (one-time only) levy for building activities, 
according to the principle of quid pro quo in which a tax is due corresponding to the marginal benefit from 
private use of public good and services. Development charges plus a tax on construction costs – introduced 
by the aforementioned law – constitute the contribution to the making of a town. This link between tax 
(charges) and performance (works) was originally intended to exclusively cover the site development and 
land expropriation costs (art. 12 of Law 10/1977). However, this link has been weakening with the 
implementation of the law: since 2001, DPR (Presidential Decree) n. 380 allows for a part of those charges 
(varying between 50 and 75% in different years' budget laws) to cover current public expenditure. Many 
researchers (Ancillotti 2007; Agnoletti 2008; Pileri 2009; Curti 2004) think that eliminating such an 
earmarking of planning fees has led to promoting urban expansion, especially in market expansion times, 
with the risk of territorial policies being subject to budget needs, instead of strategy and sustainability goals 
(Curti 2004). The share of construction fees on total municipal income varies greatly depending on territorial 
specificity and market conditions and is quite limited if compared to other fiscal income. Let’s take into exam 
the provincial capitals in Tuscany and Venetia (Tab.1). 
Fig.1 Buildable area 
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Tab.1 Shares of construction fees on province capital budget in Tuscany and in Venetia, 2012.  
(Author's elaboration on data from MEF) 
In the case of Tuscany, the share of construction fees was on average 2.96% in 2012; as for Venetia, the 
average was 1.80%. Noteworthy values are the peaks in Pisa and Leghorn, with a share close to 5%. 
The ratio between construction fees and new authorised volumes – i.e. land take, as a matter of fact – is 
biased by several variables (intended use, urban typology, implementing party), and by the impossibility of 
taking into account fees paid in the form of direct works by the entrepreneur. This practice is quite common 
in Italy, where the promoter is often the builder himself. 
In Tuscany, the comparison between the three-year periods after and before the implementation of DPR 
380/2001 does not show any discontinuity to be attributed to the possible use of construction fees for public 
expenditure financing. 
Thus, whereas a direct influence of charge revenue on planning choices is difficult to ascertain, it is clear 
that a policy of urban development containment would be contrary to the needs of local governments in 
terms of budget resources.  
In areas where urban development pressure is traditionally higher, a policy for dramatic reduction of land 
take – though desirable – would lead municipal budgets to default. If we take a look at the municipalities on 
the coast of Tuscany (tab. 2), a Region which has recently adopted very strict legislation preventing the use 
of agricultural land for urban development (L.R. 65/2014), average share of construction fees in municipal 
budgets exceeds 5%, topping well over 10% in Forte dei Marmi, Montignoso, Castagneto Carducci and 
Capalbio. As elsewhere in Italy, this shows the need of an integrated management of territorial governance 
and tax policy: otherwise, good measures of landscape safeguard risk succumbing to the need of 
safeguarding budgets. 
MUNICIPALITY TOTAL INCOME CONSTRUCTION FEES SHARE 
Massa 100.171.819 1.524.856 1,52% 
Lucca 99.261.485 2.959.762 2,98% 
Pistoia 102.061.139 2.218.311 2,17% 
Prato 223.577.386 8.052.736 3,60% 
Pisa 146.951.385 6.927.818 4,71% 
Firenze 717.942.846 6.870.868 0,96% 
Livorno 185.702.887 8.266.554 4,45% 
Arezzo  84.046.498 2.952.859 3,51% 
Siena  106.017.175 2.141.037 2,02% 
Grosseto 95.201.875 3.497.718 3,67% 
AVERAGE 2,96% 
Belluno 33.485.810 395.387 1,18% 
Treviso 90.640.667 2.883.175 3,8% 
Vicenza 165.613.519 3.087.702 1,86% 
Padova 350.199.886 6.061.571 1,73% 
Venezia 724.533.007 11.282.233 1,56% 
Verona 390.940.987 5.785.699 1,48% 
Rovigo 51.899.953 838.564 1,62% 
AVERAGE 1,80% 
S. Rusci – Council Tax Policies and Territorial Governance. Analysis and Outlook of a Difficult Relationship  
 
336 - TeMA Journal of Land Use Mobility and Environment 3 (2015) 
Tab. 2 Share of concession fees in budget of coastal municipalities of Tuscany, 2012. (Author's elaboration on data from MEF) 
Non “one-off” taxes, i.e. levies on a tax base corresponding to property stock on the municipality territory, 
show a completely different picture. In contrast with planning fees, income deriving from this kind of 
taxation is determined a priori, as linked to the quality of existing building stock in the single municipality. Its 
tax base is therefore less mobile and more uniformly distributed on the territory. This allows a more precise 
fine-tuning of tax policies, both in terms of income and investment programming. 
The percentage share of property taxation on total municipal income has greatly increased in the last years, 
owing to a combination of higher taxes and lower State transfers. Taking into exam the same sample of 
towns, here are the results (tab. 3). 
MUNICIPALITY TOTAL INCOME CONSTRUCTION FEES SHARE 
Capalbio 5.708.595 614.691 10,77% 
Orbetello 32.139.241 505.043 1,57% 
Monte Argentario 22.975.938 1.426.834 6,21% 
Magliano in Toscana 5.513.043 290.378 5,27% 
Grosseto 95.201.875 3.497.718 3,67% 
Castiglione della Pescaia 24.521.657 1.670.609 6,81% 
Scarlino 9.664.598 262.970 2,72% 
Follonica 30.770.633 1.558.866 5,07% 
Piombino 45.291.707 984.624 2,17% 
San Vincenzo 16.232.596 981.368 6,05% 
Castagneto Carducci 11.227.306 1.156.158 10,30% 
Bibbona 7.640.488 450.000 5,89% 
Cecina 28.718.587 1.907.530 6,64% 
Rosignano Marittimo 50.642.492 1.507.215 2,98% 
Livorno 185.702.887 8.715.718 4,69% 
Pisa 146.951.385 6.927.818 4,71% 
San Giuliano Terme 35.278.817 1.261.401 3,58% 
Vecchiano 9.235.785 373.360 4,04% 
Viareggio 174.881.761 1.894.146 1,08% 
Camaiore 47.588.999 2.862.402 6,01% 
Pietrasanta 54.964.418 1.713.615 3,12% 
Forte dei Marmi 33.056.332 4.403.346 13,32% 
Montignoso 10.712.525 1.286.427 12,01% 
Massa 100.171.819 1.514.856 1,51% 
Carrara 88.690.554 1.600.022 1,80% 
AVERAGE 5,28% 
MUNICIPALITY TOTAL INCOME TOTAL TAX ON PROPERTY SHARE 
Massa 100.171.819 22.261.970 22,22% 
Lucca 99.261.485 26.700.000 26,90% 
Pistoia 102.061.139 22.144.619 21,70% 
Prato 223.577.386 40.951.000 18,32% 
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Tab. 3 Shares of property taxes on province capital budget in Tuscany and in Venetia. 2012. (Author's elaboration on data from MEF) 
Average share of property income on total municipal income is 24.59% in Tuscany and slightly lower in 
Venetia, topping at around 30% in towns like Padua, Leghorn and Arezzo. 
The Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili – ICI, similar to property tax in the UK and the USA – was introduced 
in Italy in 1992 as an extraordinary measure made permanent in 1993 by Decree n. 504 of 1992, as an 
answer to public finance crisis. After a long set of integrations and modification, it was eventually replaced in 
2012 by IMU (Imposta Municipale Unica, Single Municipal Tax), by summing up the old ICI with income tax 
on property. Tax base for IMU has remained the same as for ICI, but with a much higher levy since the 
multiplier on cadastral rent raised from 100 to 160, as tax rates also were increased: tax rate was 0,4% for 
ICI, but for IMU it may vary between 0,46 and 1.06%. 
As tax base is made up by cadastral rent, the resulting income for a single municipality depends on the 
nature of its real estate stock: type of property (cadastral category) and reference market value (cadastral 
rent) are very important in this respect. Bonuses and exonerations exist for primary residence, whereas on 
other intended uses taxation is heavier and generates much more tax income (fig. 2).  
Fig. 2 IMU income distribution by cadastral category (Source: Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze - MEF) 
Pisa 146.951.385 35.742.552 24,32% 
Firenze 717.942.846 176.545.092 24,59% 
Livorno 185.702.887 54.785.232 29,50% 
Arezzo  84.046.498 24.507.920 29,16% 
Siena  106.017.175 26.100.001 24,62% 
Grosseto 95.201.875 23.393.660 24,57% 
AVERAGE 24,59% 
Belluno 33.485.810 8.305.246 24,80% 
Treviso 90.640.667 21.504.590 23,73% 
Vicenza 165.613.519 35.863.516 21,65% 
Padova 350.199.886 110.722.267 31,62% 
Venezia 724.533.007 105.863.849 14,61% 
Verona 390.940.987 94.171.011 24,09% 
Rovigo 51.899.953 14.840.612 28,59% 
AVERAGE 24,16% 
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This means that tax income of a single municipality is heavily influenced by the presence on its territory of 
intended uses other than primary residence (tertiary, production, commercial): the municipalities with more 
production and commerce on their territory will get higher revenue from   property tax than, say, others with 
the same population, same provided services but less presence of those functions. 
Since commercial and productive activities are more mobile and highly sensitive to tax differences 
(S.Piperno, S.Piazza, G. Pola 2006), local governments may have an interest in reducing tax rates in order to 
attract tax-paying activities, with possible tax competition phenomena.  
Big shopping centres, for instance, receive customers from wider areas but contribute solely to the budget of 
their own municipality, even in case of a small one. They have thus a very variable impact on council 
finance: if we take some of Tuscany's malls (tab 4), the percentage goes from 0.33% for Centro 
Commerciale Aurelia Antica to higher values for bigger shopping centers (the so-called “outlets”):  Val di 
Chiana (4,24%), or Barberino del Mugello (4,10%).  
CENTRO COMM. “I 
GIGLI” 
BARBERINO DESIGNER 
OUTLET 
VALDICHIANA OUTLET 
VILLAGE 
CENTRO COMM. 
AURELIA ANTICA
municipality Campi Bisenzio(FI) 
Barberino di Mugello 
(FI) 
Foiano della Chiana 
(AR) Grosseto (GR) 
population 45.279 10.840 9.552 81.536
total budget income 36.464.211 11.993.246 7.978.644 95.201.875
total tax income 23.577.578 7.666.010 3.578.463 60.911.333
cadastral rent 186.095,06 513.546,74 224.406,89 281.299,66
IMU rate 1,06% 1,06% 0.99% 1,06%
IMU due 113.918,09 314.367,64 151.626,13 203.506,24
share on tax income 0,48% 4,10% 4,24% 0,33%
share on total 
income 0,31% 2,62% 1,90% 0,21%
Tab. 4 Share of shopping malls on municipal tax income. (Author’s elaboration on data from MEF) 
In the above cases, municipalities decided to apply maximum rate to commercial activities, i.e. 1,06%, with 
the sole exception of Foiano della Chiana, meaning that there is no tax advantage. However, the relationship 
between highly contributing function and their location may trigger forms of territorial competition by which 
municipalities take the role of undertakings perfectly able to compete on the same territory (S.Piperno, 
S.Piazza, G. Pola 2006). It goes without saying that such competition does not necessarily lead to ideal 
location choices from a territorial point of view. 
Even in term of tax legislation, this configures a distortion of fiscal federalism principles. Attribution to local 
governments of those taxes having a mobile tax base (e.g., construction fees) and an unequal geographical 
distribution is therefore not advisable, since this could engender phenomena of tax competition, horizontal 
treatment disparity and tax migration (Lattarulo 2012; Giarda 2002). 
The strong link between municipal budget and nature of real estate stock even seems resilient to 
intermunicipal or wider area planning; on the contrary, it favours choices increasing fiscal independence of a 
given municipality. 
In France, where this phenomenon is particularly evident, tax powers were transferred to supra-municipal 
bodies by the introduction of taxe professionnelle unique; a choice which seems quite difficult in Italy after 
the abolition of Provinces. 
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It is clear that the location of highly contributing structures goes beyond commercial and urban planning 
policies; policy making cannot ignore the influence of these structures on budget reality. In the past this kind 
of influence did not lead – at least in Tuscany – to tax competition policies, but in a future in which tax 
resources are bound to remain scarce it would be wise to identify instruments allowing control and 
integrated management of such aspects. 
Beyond these two contribution modes, a third one came to be added in recent times: this is urban 
equalization, in a variety of possible forms in highly diversified regional models. 
Urban equalization does not strictly belong to tax instruments; still, it has an impact on the public city 
through private sector involvement. Like planning fees, urban equalization is a one-time contribution for a 
development plan. Charges imposed by urban equalization vary on the basis of different local provisions and 
formulas: from monetary contributions (value equalization) to the more common transfer of areas or 
building rights (volume equalization) (Stanghellini 2013). 
The classical goal of urban equalization is twofold: equality of treatment for individuals and bodies 
intervening in urban transformation, on one hand, and an efficient allocation of the resources it generates, 
on the other (Micelli 2011). In such way, urban rent can be redistributed among all owners of involved areas 
and a quota of this yield can revert to public sector. The different equalization formulas, which nowadays are 
well tested, originate form the diverse modulation of those aims. 
Forfeiture and compensability of urban constraints, along with the ever growing difficulty for public finance 
to sustain expropriation costs at market value, have converted equalization into the normal and preferred 
method for acquiring public areas, a method that experienced a very quick diffusion and implementation in 
recent years. 
Back to its two main aims, urban equalization has a double action: between individual owners of the areas to 
be transformed (horizontal equalization), so as to redistribute development right in an uniform way; and 
between individuals and public sector – vertical equalization –, by giving back to society part of urban rent 
through the transfer of public areas. 
In the case of “horizontal” equalization we are dealing with a tool that is quite in line with the provisions of 
Law 1150 of 1942, whose Article 23 states that development quotas shall be distributed in accordance with 
land plot value, regardless of permitted uses on the areas. This form of equalization is not socially 
redistributive and has no influence on fiscal capability of municipalities, because the grand total remains 
unchanged. On the other hand, “vertical” equalization redistributes part of the yield through the transfer of 
areas or development rights. Vertical equalization can thus be compared to tax levy, albeit a non monetary 
one, as based on the quid pro quo principle. 
It should be mentioned that, owing to its dependence on economic expansion, urban equalization in both 
varieties – compensative and redistributive – is highly vulnerable to market recession: if no new areas are to 
be transformed and economic yield remains unchanged, the quid pro quo between individuals and public 
authority cannot take place (Micelli 2011). 
Urban equalization is sometimes coupled with various form of monetary equalization in order to guarantee 
better balance between private and public sector, or with aim-oriented forms of contribution for the 
execution of public works, or again with fees on added value to be used in different budget posts. 
Without denying the difficulty of determining such added values – all the more in the turbulent market of a 
crisis time -, this latter kind of equalization seems most interesting nowadays, as it is less dependent on 
economic expansion and can be used in urban renewal programs. Last but not least, it can be used as an 
incentive or disincentive in particular urban strategies or interventions. 
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Fig. 3 Urban landscape 
In more recent times, equalization has assumed an important role in redistributing costs and benefits of 
structures at an intermunicipal level. This form of equalization, called territorial equalization, does not 
happen between public and private sector, but between public bodies of same or different level. 
As we have seen in the case of shopping malls, the presence of structures capable of capturing users form a 
wider area is determining for municipal finance, with possible phenomena of territorial and tax competition 
with no regard to efficient and sustainable spatial planning. These big structures use large-scale 
infrastructures, but they only contribute to their own municipality, thus completely distorting the fiscal 
federalism principles. 
Just as urban equalization, territorial equalization as well has a double goal: firstly, it aims to equality 
through a correct distribution of the costs and benefits of a given structure on the territory; secondly, 
territorial equalization has a more economic objective, i.e. a better allocation of resources by taking 
advantage of all possible scale economies and agglomeration forms. Territorial equalization should therefore 
intervene in a very wide spectrum of disciplines: environmental, economic and financial, but also social and 
institutional ones (Piperno, Piazza, Pola, 2006), in order to assure coherence among different levels of 
governance. 
Examples of territorial equalization remain very limited and mostly confined to the tax field, generally 
mimicking the French taxe professionnelle unique (TPU) by which administrations put in common those 
resources deriving from the productive structures they share; or even the US experience of tax base sharing 
(TBS), in which it is tax base what is shared. In Italy, the first example of such legislation is Emilia 
Romagna's Regional Law n. 2/2000, allowing the creation of mutual funds between local authorities to be 
financed by planning fees and tax revenue from shared structures. A similar provision was recently adopted 
by Tuscany (Regional Law n. 65/2014), prescribing territorial equalization for all plans on undeveloped land 
situated outside already developed areas. Also in this case a mutual fond is foreseen. In other Italian 
Regions (Venetia, Lombardy, Umbria) less explicit reference is made to equalization, which is left to 
negotiation and agreements between administrations (Mazzeo, Pinto 2011). Challenges in implementing 
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such measures derive both from the difficulty of estimating monetary compensation for environmental 
impact, and from the difficulty of identifying the managers of the shared resources. This latter difficulty 
became greater with the abolition of provinces. It is easy to demonstrate that the implementation of 
planning at wider area scale requires the contextual assumption of tax sharing instruments, in order to 
balance tax revenue and to avoid the risk of planning choices based on too high tax income expectations 
(Stanghellini 1999). The ultimate goal is thus to prevent forms of tax competition that would undermine 
institutional cooperation. 
3 TAXATION OF AVAILABLE AREAS FOR CONSTRUCTION 
Bearing in mind the goals of this article, building land represents an interesting element, for several reasons: 
first, it constitutes an intersection point between urban planning and tax and finance disciplines; besides, 
there is a link between planning and expansion resulting in areas for construction as an end product.; 
furthermore, building land is the economic factor around which urban rent is formed, thus representing the 
most important economic factor in the building development process. In past times, urban rent formation 
was the object of a lively ideological debate about taxing land added value. This debate, though, did not 
lead to real reforms and had the sole effect of introducing INVIM, a new tax on property revaluation (Decree 
n. 643 of 1972), finally abolished in 1992 and replaced by ICI, nowadays IMU. 
In comparison to building taxation, whose tax base is defined by a revaluation of cadastral rent (Laws n. 662 
of 1996 and 214 of 2011), taxation on building plots posed several challenges regarding both the conditions 
for the application of tax and the definition of tax base. The condition for such taxation depends, first of all, 
on the definition itself of building land for tax purposes. Such a definition was established for the first time 
with the introduction of ICI (art 2.1/b of Decree n. 504 of 1992): building area is defined as the “area usable 
for construction in accordance with general urban planning instruments, or on the basis of actual possibilities 
of construction...”. This definition gave rise to several interpretation problems: for instance, there was 
disagreement on the prerequisite for taxing, successively identified as: the need for immediate use and thus 
the approval of implementing acts (Court of Cassation, decision n. 21644/2004); the regional approval of the 
general instrument (Court of Cassation, decision n. 16751/2004); the simple inclusion of that area in the 
general instrument even if not yet approved (Court of Cassation, decision n. 19750/2004). In the view of 
such uncertainty, it was initially clarified that a given area is to be considered as buildable “when it may be 
used for construction on the basis of the general urban planning instrument, even if the corresponding 
implementing act are still pending of approval” (art. 11/M.16 of Law n. 248/2005). Subsequently, Decree 
Law n .223/2006 came to add that an area is buildable on the basis of the general instrument, regardless of 
approval of said instrument and its implementing plans: this means that, for tax purposes, an area is to be 
considered buildable following the mere adoption of the strategic instrument. 
Both legislating bodies and Court of Cassation (decision n. 25506 of 2006) did state that added value from 
urban development has its origin in the very moment when for a given area a transformation is foreseen 
even in a distant future. 
Aside from legal interpretations, the consequence of such decisions led to a mismatch between the 
definitions of “buildable” in use in urban planning, on one hand, and in tax policies, on the other. As a 
matter of fact, if the mere adoption of a general instrument is sufficient for an area to be considered 
buildable and thus taxable, you need definitive approval of that general instrument, plus of operational and 
implementing ones, in order to have building rights confirmed on that very area. If we consider building 
rights as a productive cycle starting when first expenditure is made, this mismatch leads to longer timing 
because taxes are due sooner. 
In the case of Tuscany, where a distinction between general and operational planning is made, the time 
lapse between start of taxation and approval of implementing plan is on average five years (fig. 4)  
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Fig. 4 Duration of planning process in Tuscany (Source: IRPET and Osservatorio permanente della Pubblica Amministrazione)
From a mere fiscal viewpoint, revenue levied in this time lapse, assuming a base rate of 0.76%, amounts to 
3.80% of total value of the area, reaching 5.30% in case of maximum tax rate (a widely applied 1.06%). 
This is enough to erode a significant part of added value originated from the prevision of building on that 
land, and the erosion can become even bigger in case of further delay. 
With such a definition of building land for tax purposes, time becomes an essential issue not only in terms of 
interest due on capital, but also – and above all – because of land rent eroding possible added value form 
the transformation. In economic terms, building land looses its value as shelter investment in favour of 
production. In a not so distant past things were different: numbers were different, and the impact of interest 
payments was sensibly lower than a yield whose obtainment was certain. Besides, the flowing of time didn't 
trigger extra costs: before 1993, transformation into building land didn't involve a change of tax regime. 
This loss of value in time, plus uncertainty about land rent because of market changes, has been triggering 
unexpected phenomena: in Tuscany, out of a sample of municipalities (54% of regional total surface), 63% 
had received requests from individuals asking for revocation of building rights in areas which were already in 
planning instruments (Cutini; Rusci 2015). 
In some cases (Altopascio, Arezzo, Bientina) this phenomenon took such proportions that public 
administrations have worked out specific instruments for facing revocation requests (“varianti in riduzione”, 
variations for reduction). This phenomenon is unusual in Italy, a country where planning policies of the past 
fifty years were driven by a rush to transform land into building plots. 
In order to mitigate distortions linked to advance tax paying, some local governments identified corrective 
factors taking into account specific conditions of a given area, thus reducing levy on land still awaiting 
development. From one side, this reduces the injustice of taxing plots which de facto do not constitute 
building land; from the other, a new factor of discretion and complexity is introduced in the determination of 
taxable values, thus giving rise to a great debate, currently still out of the courts. 
IMU inherited from ICI the provision according to which the taxable value of a building plot equals its market 
value at January, 1st of fiscal year (art. 5 of Law 214/2011), in spite of the fact that common statistical or 
benchmarking data are missing. Tax determination is left to estimates, which, by their very nature, are 
influenced by evaluator's discretion and market fluctuation. For these reasons, local bodies were given 
power to autonomously determine reference values (Law Decree n. 446/1997), partly renouncing to their 
ability to conduct inspections if the owner accepts the estimate. Such estimate should ascertain market value 
keeping into account all implicit and explicit factors established by Law Decree n. 504 of 1992: geographical 
situation, urban parameters, intended use, charges and market prices for similar property.  However, when 
examining municipalities' decisions, estimates often do not match market value: this is partly because 
defining and adapting estimates to every single transformation is objectively difficult, partly because there is 
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a tendency to underestimate so as to avoid possible litigation. On the other extreme, cases are given in 
which pre-crisis estimates are much higher than market value. 
In the absence of comparable statistical data, resorting to market value is inevitable for building plots. 
Nevertheless, it is self-evident that such a practice involves a very volatile tax base owing to market opacity 
(Morano 2014) and strong fluctuations, with high costs for both estimation and inspection. Proposed 
solutions (Morano 2014; Ciuna 2010) are based on the definition of uniform and codified estimation 
methods, with the risk those methods could not match real estate quotations. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
For over twenty years now, local taxation and urban planning have been regarded as two strongly 
interconnected areas that do not dialogue. “Taxation and new urban planning legislation” was the title of a 
paper presented in 1995 at the 21st Congress of Istituto Nazionale di Urbanistica – INU (Stanghellini 1999). 
Since then, some proposals were turned into operational measures: such is the case of equalization, ICI-IMU 
and tax benefits (for principal residence and for renovations); other proposals still await implementation 
(e.g., cadastre reform). 
This debate led to overcome the idea that, in decision making, urban planning must be subordinate to local 
taxation or vice-versa. Nevertheless, new forms of synergy and coordination between the two areas are still 
to be identified. 
The widespread idea that urban planning taxation remains perfectible (Lattarulo 2012) is justified by the 
absence in Italy of a coordination between fiscal, productive and territorial policies. To scholars, it is clear 
that the impact of local tax policies (which often aim to respond to short-term budget contingencies) ends 
up having a determining and lasting influence on space planning, especially in terms of site choice and 
investment forms preferred by entrepreneurs.  
Our analysis casts light on two important elements, bound to be crucial in the next future. On the one hand, 
the relationship between urban planning and local taxation: spatial and functional choices in planning have 
an increasingly strong influence on municipalities' fiscal capacity, and guidelines and options in the area of 
taxation decide the destiny of urban planning provisions. The second element, on the other hand, is the link 
between local taxation and real estate market as established by fiscal federalism: both revenue from 
planning fees and income from property taxation (IMU) are subject to real estate market fluctuations, just as 
local expenditure cycles depend on real estate cycles (Curti 2004). 
Territorial governance and local taxation appear today like two equal but opposite forces in local policy: 
environmental and social sustainability in local governance often seems to collide with financial sustainability 
and autonomy imposed by fiscal federalism. 
If we take into exam the main topics for the urban planning agenda of the last ten years, contradictions in 
this relationship are self-evident: land consumption mitigation, wider area planning, territorial equalization 
seem to be antithetical to the needs of financial autonomy imposed on municipalities by fiscal federalism. 
As shown, revenue from new development (urban planning fees, construction fees) in some municipalities 
accounts for more than 10% of total municipal income, thus becoming indispensable for covering current 
expenditure with a parallel loosening of permitted use. This tendency to linking urban programming to 
budget needs involves undeniable challenges; but it is also true that dramatic measures of land consumption 
containment, as those implemented by Tuscany in recent times, might lead in present conditions to the 
collapse of many local realities. 
Even in the case of real estate taxation, which is far more consistent than urban planning fees, there is 
strong contradiction between territorial and fiscal policies. The amount of tax revenue is dependent on the 
quality and above all the function of property stock; the more its prestige and the greater the number of 
other types than principal residence (second houses, production, commerce), the higher tax revenue will be. 
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It is therefore clear that this strict link between special functions and tax revenue involves forms of tax 
competition, while hindering supra-municipal planning and the various modes of territorial equalization 
experimented today. If for urban planning one can envisage shared decision making between municipalities 
of a same geographic area, those same municipalities will be hardly open to share fiscal income deriving 
from location choices of wider structures. 
Ultimately, gradual cross-linking between municipal revenue and property market variations in the last 20 
years (Curti 2004) (this is especially true for planning fees) seems antithetical to stability in the provision of 
services. 
The cadastre reform initiated with Delegated Law n. 23 of March, 11 of 2014 (at the moment the reform is 
blocked by Government awaiting local tax details) seemed to be an opportunity to establish a link between 
planning choices and local tax management, thanks to the proposals for a wider and richer property 
database, plus the correction of present cartography, thus enabling better data exchange between planning 
and collecting bodies. Many of the aforementioned structural challenges remain nevertheless unresolved: the 
relationship between rent and property market fluctuations, above all, with a clear contradiction between 
real market values, which are variable, and cadastral estimates, which are fix.  
During these last twenty years, studies and proposals in the areas of taxation and urban planning – i.e. how 
to manage value added generated by planning – have aimed at two goals: (1) containment of public 
expenditure through fiscal federalism, making as far as possible provision of services conditional on fiscal 
capacity of a single municipality; (2) a fairer redistribution (private to private, private to society) of revenue 
generated by urban transformation, by identifying alternative formulas to those condemned in constitutional 
court decisions. 
The building-up of a substantial urban rent from land regime has been amply studied and challenged by 
urban planners for over 50 years. It was the basis for the various forms of taxation in time (INVIM, ICI, 
IMU). This same urban rent fuelled (albeit minimally, owing to inadequate norms) changes in public town; 
with the introduction of equalization, nowadays it represents a reservoir for future local body resources.  
Today, the goal of integrating tax and planning policies appears suddenly changed with the additional need 
to identify strategies for guaranteeing interventions in an economic context by which real estate investments 
and plans cannot be taken for granted: just think of the aforementioned example of building rights 
revocation requests. 
This new framework, which apparently might suggest better environmental sustainability in the future, and 
which some people see as a desirable bursting of a real-estate bubble with no economic foundation, poses 
severe challenges to public authorities, because local finance and property market are so strongly linked. In 
this economic context, the first currency to be devalued is the urban planning one, i.e. money paid by 
private sector to municipalities to compensate for urban transformation through equalization and tax paying. 
In other words, local bodies are today business partners running the risk of sharing with the private sector 
losses caused by the market weakness. 
Without denying the challenges posed by the private acquisition of urban rent, it is also true that in recent 
years we have seen a complete overturning of the economic context without a similar overturning in urban 
planning action and goals, which remain bound to nowadays marginal topics. 
In the light of the above analysis, the link existing between local taxation and urban planning is an 
indisputable fact. What is still missing is a correct management of this very link by those bearing the 
responsibility of managing and planning. Potentially positive synergies remain thus unexpressed, and 
challenges stay unresolved. 
An integration between tax instruments and spatial planning appears both useful and necessary to reactivate 
public policies capable of guiding investments and interventions, even in the absence of expansive dynamics, 
through forms of tax modulations taking into account the main criteria (such as energy, social questions, 
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location criteria etc); or through incentives and new tools for joint management at territorial scale. Quoting 
Robert Venturi, our challenge is to pursue a difficult whole through an inclusive process, instead of an easy 
whole through exclusion.  
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